The Effectiveness of Using a Public-Private-Partnership Model for Urban Rail Transit: The Vancouver Case by Bian, Jie
Western University
Scholarship@Western
MPA Major Research Papers Local Government Program
7-1-2016
The Effectiveness of Using a Public-Private-
Partnership Model for Urban Rail Transit: The
Vancouver Case
Jie Bian
Western University
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/lgp-mrps
Part of the Public Administration Commons
This Major Research Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Local Government Program at Scholarship@Western. It has been accepted
for inclusion in MPA Major Research Papers by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Western. For more information, please contact
tadam@uwo.ca, wlswadmin@uwo.ca.
Recommended Citation
Bian, Jie, "The Effectiveness of Using a Public-Private-Partnership Model for Urban Rail Transit: The Vancouver Case" (2016). MPA
Major Research Papers. 145.
https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/lgp-mrps/145
  
 
The Effectiveness of Using a Public-Private-Partnership Model for Urban 
Rail Transit: The Vancouver Case 
 
 
 
MPA Research Report 
 
 
Submitted to 
The Local Government Program 
Department of Political Science 
Western University 
 
 
 
Jie Bian 
July 2016 
 
 
	   2	  
Executive Summary  
PPP (or P3s), an abbreviation for Public-Private-Partnership, has become highly 
popular in Canada in recent years. As a new co-operative model between public and 
private sectors, PPP has the potential to satisfy the public's demand for the efficient 
delivery of high-quality policy outputs. Municipalities often use this method for 
public infrastructure delivery because of its potential benefits, such as improving the 
efficiency of projects, transferring risks to private sector, engaging the general public, 
and so forth. P3s for Canadian transportation involve the private sector in designing, 
building, financing, and operating the facilities. Since public transit is an essential part 
of people’s daily life, it is important to examine the effectiveness of using P3s for this 
type of infrastructure. 
This paper provides a specific evaluation of the benefits of P3s by comparing a DBFO 
project and two non-DBFO projects in Metro Vancouver. I used this public 
transportation case study to analyze the potential benefits of P3s based on three 
variables: efficiency, fulfillment of original purposes, and procedural transparency. 
Ultimately, there were very few apparent merits of P3s in the Vancouver case because 
the political context limited the impact of P3s. This finding is related to the PPP 
projects in the Chinese context; under its top-down political system, PPP practices in 
China experienced similar political constraints as the Vancouver case. This paper 
concludes that although P3s will realize their potential benefits in some circumstances, 
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the actual effects of local governments using P3s for public transit depends on the 
broader political context.  
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Introduction  
In recent decades, public-private partnerships have become a globally accepted tool 
for public service delivery. In Canada, P3s have been used for major infrastructure 
projects, including transportation, water and wastewater, hospitals, and other facilities. 
Proponents of P3s typically emphasize its benefits, including improved financing 
from private sectors and higher efficiency through private ownership or market 
competition (Ho, Levitt, Tsui & Hsu, 2015). The co-operation between local 
governments and private sectors often emerges because of the public sector’s 
financial constraints. Private sector actors’ ability to innovate and its managerial 
efficiency are also a key incentive for municipalities to work with private parties 
rather than use conventional public procurement methods. In addition, P3s have 
become an increasingly popular solution in developing countries, such as China, to 
provide public infrastructure within a limited governmental budget.  
However, because some PPP projects have failed to achieve their potential benefits, a 
contentious debate has emerged about whether the PPP model is a useful public 
service delivery method for municipalities (Vining, 2008). The application of P3s for 
public infrastructure has important social, political, and economic implications. Public 
transportation not only plays an essential role in people’s daily life, but also helps to 
develop local economies because new public transit options attract new business 
opportunities. This report examines the effectiveness of using P3s for public 
transportation infrastructure by focusing on two main research questions. First, 
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compared with traditional public procurement, is the PPP model an effective method 
to deliver public infrastructure projects, especially transportation infrastructure? 
Second, which factors have the most impact on the potential benefits of P3s? 
Answering these two questions will provide valuable information about public service 
delivery and will provide a valuable information for municipalities attempting to 
structure P3s for public infrastructure projects. 
Specifically, this research evaluates the potential benefits of the PPP model by 
conducting a case study of public transit in Vancouver. Through a comparison of the 
Canada Line, the Expo Line, and the Millennium Line, this report will demonstrate 
that the unique municipal and provincial political context has a huge impact on the 
effectiveness of P3s. Chapter One provides a detailed review of literature about the 
PPP model, including the driving forces of P3s, different PPP models, potential 
benefits and drawbacks of P3s (especially the impacts of the political context), and 
PPP practices in Canada. Chapter Two describes the research methods and some basic 
information about the case study. As the most important part of the report, Chapter 
Three has two essential parts. The first is a comparison of three projects according to 
three variables: efficiency, fulfillment of original purposes, procedural transparency, 
and public involvement. The second part analyzes the impact of Vancouver’s specific 
political context on these projects. Chapter Four compares the results of the 
Vancouver case to the Chinese context. Ultimately, the report concludes that the 
political context might shape the potential benefits and drawbacks of the PPP model. 
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Chapter One: Literature Review 
Since the 1990s, the PPP model has been a heated research topic for scholars in 
several academic areas, especially in political science. Most of this research has 
involved empirical analysis and case study. E.S. Savas (1999), the great master of 
privatization, was invaluable in the dissemination of the concept, development, and 
practice of PPPs.  
Generally, PPPs have two conceptual aspects: generalized and narrow. Generalized 
PPPs include various contractual and co-operative partnerships based on particular 
negotiated terms between public and private sectors to deliver and finance public 
services and infrastructure, such as Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT), 
Build-Own-Operate-Transfer (BOOT), and Design-Build-Finance-Operate (DBFO). 
Narrow PPPs are a series of project financing models. In a narrow concept model, 
both public and private sector maintain a co-operative relationship, emphasizing 
risk-sharing mechanisms and “value-for-money” (VFM). This paper refers to a 
variety of generalized cooperative partnerships and models.  
Following Savas’ research, other scholars have continued to research the reasons for 
the emergence of the PPP model as a new method of public service delivery and its 
corresponding advantages and disadvantages. Academics have conducted specific 
research on the strengths and weaknesses of DBFO models in different contexts.   
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Driving Forces of the PPP Model 
Following the failure of the “Welfare State” and “Keynesian economics”, Western 
countries have tended towards smaller government; in general, residents prefer 
smaller and more efficient governments to deliver public goods and services (Savas, 
Osborne & Gaebler, 1992). Consequently, privatization has become a global trend in 
which the government invites the market to help secure the delivery of public goods 
and services.  
In Privatization and Public Private Partnerships, Savas (1999) identified the 
following driving forces of the PPP model: political pressure; economic, ideological 
and business force; and populism. Savas assumed that, owing to economic growth and 
expansion of government size, residents would like to reduce government intervention 
and have more influence on public service delivery. Similarly, Fourie and Burger 
(2001) assumed that the main catalyst for the PPP model is insufficient government 
management capacity. While public agencies generally self-fund public goods, they 
may adopt the PPP model when there are limited financial resources or high levels of 
public dissatisfaction. However, in some cases, PPPs have become part of official 
policy for ideological reasons. For example, the Conservative federal government 
under Stephen Harper (2006-2015) required that all projects with eligible costs over 
$100 million undergo a PPP assessment to qualify for federal infrastructure funding 
(Garcea, 2015). 
Grimsey and Lewis (2002) also find that insufficient funding for fundamental 
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infrastructure is the main reason for governments to invite private sectors to 
participate in project financing, construction, and operations. Other scholars 
(Hammami, Ruhashyankiko & Yehoue, 2006) have found that countries with 
governments carrying a large debt burden are more likely to practice the PPP model.  
The Characteristics of Different PPP models 
There are several kinds of PPP models for public infrastructure delivery, varying in 
terms of the public and private distribution of tasks along different variables, 
including: design, construction, financing, ownership, and operation (Figure 1). 
      Variable 
Type 
Design Construction Financing Ownership Operation 
Design-Bid-Build PU PR PU PU PU 
Private Contract 
Fee Services 
PR PR PU PU PU 
Design Build PR PR PU PU PU 
Build Operate 
Transfer 
PR PR PR PU PR 
Design Build 
Finance Operate 
PR PR PR PU PR 
Build Own 
Operate 
PR PR PR PR PR 
 
Figure 1: Types of PPP model 
Note: PR refers to the private sector; PU refers to the public sector. 
Traditionally, public infrastructure projects have been delivered through a variant of 
the design-bid-build approach in developed countries, such as the private contract fee 
services and the design-build model. The design-bid-build approach works as follows: 
the responsible public agency designs a scheme to address a social problem, then 
organizes a bidding process for a private sector concessionaire to build the public 
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infrastructure (World Bank, 2015). The public sector provides specifications for the 
technology the private sector uses for the project and then operates the system after 
construction is finished. 
During the 1980s to 1990s, governments across the developed world encouraged the 
private sector to take a larger role in the financing and operation process of public 
sector infrastructure in order to reduce public sector expenditures and increase the 
rationality of project by adding competitive conditions,. The public sector used the 
Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) approach to deliver public projects, in which private 
sector entrepreneurs were selected depending on their ability to meet the public 
interest and generate profits; the private sector then designed, financed, and operated 
the new infrastructure (Gatti, 2007). With the Build-Own-Operate (BOO) approach, 
the private sector often owns the infrastructure and does not return ownership rights to 
the public utility until after a specified contractual period of time.  
Beginning in the 1990s, the Design-Build-Finance-Operate (DBFO) model became 
the most popular mechanism for delivering large public infrastructure. It has been 
used for transportation projects in many countries (Debande, 2002). In the DBFO 
model of project delivery, the private-sector concessionaire is responsible for 
designing a technological solution that best meets the public objectives at the lowest 
cost. The private sector concessionaire is also invited to finance and operate the 
project. Once the contractual time is completed, the public-sector agency can then 
either retender or operate the system using public-sector employees (Pekka, 2002). 
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Figure 2 illustrates a brief flow diagram of a DBFO project. However, as this paper 
will later discuss, this is not applicable to all cases because each PPP project has its 
own uniqueness and a specific political context that will affect its success. 
This paper mainly focuses on the DBFO method, in which government maintains 
ownership rights, to examine the advantages of the PPP model. Due to the long-term 
nature of infrastructure project arrangements, this model is useful in determining how 
government can balance public interest with cost-efficiency and also provide enough 
space for technical innovations.  
 
 
Advantages and Disadvantages of DBFO 
Advantages  
As one of the common types of PPP model, the DBFO method shares the general 
advantages and disadvantages of other PPP models. Savas (1999) argues that various 
models of PPP could be used to coordinate public sectors and private sectors to 
deliver public infrastructure. Across PPP models, the benefits are similar: (1) update 
fundamental infrastructure to meet the demands of increasing population; (2) 
Government	  Agencies	   DBFO	  Project	  Companies	  DBFO	  Contract	  
Construction	  Company	  
Operate	  and	  Maintain	  Company	  
Provide	  performance	  specifications	  
Carry	  out	  the	  Contract	  Finance,	  Build	  and	  Operate	  the	  Project	  
Contract	   of	  construction	  
Contract	   of	  Operation	  and	  Maintain	  
Figure	  2:	  The	  Process	  of	  DBFO	  Project	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minimize the cost of infrastructure construction to avoid high fees that could result in 
the dissatisfaction of the general public; (3) raise funds for other projects by charging 
private companies for accessing concessions; and (4) reduce the government’s 
financial burden and minimizing risks for taxpayers. Vining, Boardman, and 
Poschmann (2008) concluded similar rationales for PPP models, finding that the 
private sector has the ability to deliver infrastructure at lower cost due to more 
experience, better incentives, and greater innovation.  
According to Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius, and Rothengatter (2003), the DBFO method has 
three main benefits. First, it transfers risks to the partner who can better manage it. As 
public and private sectors can manage different types of risks, the process of 
allocating and transferring risks is different from the conventional public sector 
procurement model. Second, the rationality of projects will be improved because the 
design and construction process respects technical specifications. The government 
provides performance specifications to the private sector, which requires them to meet 
public interests with a lower cost. Third, DBFO can improve procedural 
accountability and the financial responsibility of the projects. The greater private 
involvement can improve transparency and legitimate public participation, which 
promotes greater accountability for public sector investments. Since private 
contributors risk personal loss if the project does not produce a profit, this promotes 
the incentive to design a more realistic design proposal. 
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In addition to the above three benefits, the separation of capital financing of a DBFO 
project from its ongoing funding does not add to public debt (Ferlie, Lynn & Pollitt, 
2005). Consequently, this benefit will be treated as accidental to the project’s output 
and will not be reflected on the public balance sheet. Additionally, the DBFO model 
helps to balance the advantage of government control over the protection of public 
interests and the benefit of inviting competitive forces into public service delivery in 
order to increase efficiency (Siemiatycki, 2006). This model can also accelerate 
construction, deliver infrastructure on time and on budget, save costs, and enable the 
public sector to focus on outcomes and core business (Murphy, 2008). Moreover, 
DBFO is suitable for mega-projects and the delivery of public transportation. If 
governments apply the model properly and projects are carefully designed based on 
value for money, feasibility analysis, and life-cycle analysis, total costs for the project 
should be reduced (Altshuler & Luberoff, 2003; Brown et al., 2009).  
Ultimately, the DBFO method has three main advantages according to the literature 
review: (1) it transfers risks to the partner best able to manage them, which maximizes 
cost-savings and prevents time delays; (2) it balances the advantages of government 
control and the benefit of competitive forces to improve the efficiency of project 
delivery—the private sector must follow the specifications provided by the 
responsible public agency while using the best technical method to achieve the 
objectives at the lowest cost—; and (3) it improves procedural transparency and 
accountability, which improves the efficacy of private involvement and public 
engagement.  
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Disadvantages  
There are also critics and suspicions against PPP models raised by some academics. 
Because governments must respect long-term contract requirements and obligations, 
project management is less flexible; it is difficult for governments to change the 
content or method for service delivery when new circumstances emerge (Ross, Yan, 
2015). However, while one of the drivers for the use of the PPP model is that the 
private sector is better able to provide both infrastructure and services at lower cost 
due to more experience, better incentives, and greater ability to innovate, P3s cannot 
minimize the government expenditures (Vining, 2008). No matter how a project is 
financed, the government can only spread its cost obligations over a longer time 
period through using PPPs and still has to pay for its construction at the end. 
According to Murphy (2008), the private sector may become a competitor in the 
market when it delivers public services and infrastructure due its inherent focus on 
profits. Accordingly, it can become difficult for the government to control the price 
when they assign the concession agreement. This could result in poor quality of 
public services and higher transaction costs.  
In addition to those general disadvantages, the DBFO style of the PPP model has 
further weaknesses. Pekka (2002) argues that DBFO is not suitable for long-term 
relationships because political changes will affect previously-signed commitments. 
Owing to the long-term nature of arranging infrastructure delivery, the construction 
cost of projects might escalate during the planning process of public infrastructure 
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delivery. In these situations, the DBFO method might be unable to prevent cost 
escalations and government intervention during the planning process (Zheng, 
Roehrich & Lewis, 2008).  
Tradeoffs  
Overall, these disadvantages and advantages depend on the precise structure of the 
PPP agreement. In some cases, the potential benefits of P3s are outweighed by 
transaction costs. Transactions costs are likely to be high when asset specificity, 
construction complexity, and revenue uncertainty is high, while contract management 
effectiveness is poor (Vining, 2008). Additionally, private-sector participants are 
risk-adjusted profit maximizers (Vining, 2008), which mean they are willing to give 
up some profits if they can bear fewer risks - especially revenue risks. This is because 
private sector organizations will bear risks more directly than the public sector, which 
can lead to negative consequences. Consequently, the private sector may enact high 
premiums before accepting use risks. For example, the Alberta Special Waste 
Management System PPP project was finally terminated because of enormous 
contracting costs, which far exceeding the potential benefits of P3s. BOVAR，the 
responsible private company, asked for a high guaranteed rate of return because its 
profits were a function of its capital investment rather than its cost-efficiency (Vining, 
2008).  
The Impacts of the Political Context  
In addition to the “tradeoffs” mentioned above, the theoretical advantages and 
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disadvantages of different PPP models may be affected in practice by elements of the 
specific political context.  I also need to clarify the conception of “politically 
interference” and “politically driven” in this paper: PPP projects that are often driven 
by political elements, such as popularity, re-election concerns, or elite interests, rather 
than sound public policy judgments. Also, governments may interfere with the 
planning process to ensure that the project will proceed as originally planned.  
Some academics argue that politicians influence privatization attitudes. Even when 
the private sector is capable of delivering public services, governments still generally 
consider themselves the main supplier of some inherent “public” services and will 
often insert themselves unnecessarily into the planning process of PPPs (Pomeroy, 
1998). Some literature suggests that if a project is politically driven, the government 
may then fail to structure a PPP optimally or remain committed to the PPP if it is not 
delivering desired results (Erie, Kogan, and MacKenzie, 2010).  
Asquith, Brunton, and Robinson (2015) also emphasize the significant impact of the 
political context on PPP projects, which threatens to undermine the project’s 
effectiveness potentially. Under the transitory political process, parties tend to think 
of themselves as vulnerable when entering into long-term P3s contracts because they 
may only be in power for a short period of time. Other literature suggests that the 
perception of controversial infrastructure projects among the broader public may 
affect the extent to which both public and PPP models remain open to public input. 
For example, decision-makers tend to insulate controversial projects from the public, 
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which might result in too much government involvement in PPP projects (Asian 
Development Bank, 2008). As these situations demonstrate, the broader political 
context can enact a significant influence on the effectiveness of P3s.  
Canadian Practices of the DBFO model  
As one of the first countries to use the PPP models, Canada began to apply the PPP 
model in the 1980s, although it was not until the mid-1990s that PPPs really began to 
take hold (Vining, Boardman, 2008). Government failure is the main reason for the 
use of PPP models in Canadian public services delivery. Since Canada’s 
infrastructure has been neglected for many years, resolving this problem exceeds the 
capacities of governments—especially at municipal level. Therefore, in order to 
maintain effective governance, governments invite market forces to partner with them 
to deliver public infrastructure (Euromoney Publications PLC, 2002). In 2008, the 
federal government established PPP Canada, a Federal Crown Corporation, which 
acts as the leading expertise on PPP matters. 
PPP development in Canada can be divided into two waves. The first wave of PPPs 
were planned and delivered in the 1990s and the early 2000s when governments were 
motivated by similar PPP rationales. Chief among these rationales included the fact 
that P3s can save government expenditures and transfer demand risk to the private 
sector partner. Furthermore, PPP projects involve greater competition and public 
participation, leading to lower costs and greater efficiency. Although there are some 
successful examples of PPP projects during this time, many projects have been 
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heavily criticized. Common criticisms include: projects were politically driven; there 
was no effective assessment to evaluate the benefits of using P3s rather than 
traditional public procurement methods; governments lacked the expertise to manage 
the contract; and governments failed to maximize the public interests. In response to 
these criticisms, Canada has been developing a second wave of PPPs since the 
mid-2000s. During this second wave of projects, Canada’s provincial governments 
have been the leading users of PPPs to deliver public infrastructure (Siemiatycki, 
2010). 
Several research publications suggest that PPP projects in Canada have failed to 
maintain the balance between public interests and private profits (Iseki, Houtman, 
2012). Furthermore, according to Siemiatycki, (2010), PPPs in Canada have been 
treated as a procurement strategy. First, PPP projects follow the same prioritization 
and selection processes as traditional public procurement projects. Second, Canadian 
governments tend to apply the PPP model to design, construct, finance, and maintain 
the hard physical asset rather than operate the core public service itself. Scholars still 
need to do more research to find out why Canadian PPPs have these special 
characteristics. 
The DBFO type of PPP as a delivery mechanism of public infrastructure is a new 
phenomenon in Canada (Siemiatycki, 2006). By inserting competition and 
free-market accountability into project planning and operational processes, procedural 
transparency and transfer risk between public and private sectors can be improved. 
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Many scholars find that this is especially important for mega-projects, such as public 
transportation and power generation, which are extremely important for the social 
welfare but less attractive to private investment (Siemiatycki, 2010; Siemiatycki, 
2012). Other scholars argue that there is minimal difference between DBFO projects 
and traditional public projects. The willingness of private sectors to bear user risk 
decreases with the level of user risk; private sectors will generally not participate in a 
DBFO project if they need to bear a large revenue risk. Consequently, the DBFO 
model is only beneficial for governments if the private sector bears cost risks, rather 
than revenue risks (Vining, Boardman, 2008). Otherwise, the private sector could ask 
for exorbitant premiums to accept revenue risks, which would then outweigh the 
potential benefits of P3s.  
It is necessary to evaluate the effectiveness of the DBFO method both because public 
infrastructure delivery is an inevitable part of governance and because there is 
minimal academic research on DBFO projects in Canada. Based on the above 
research, the DBFO type of PPP model has become a popular mechanism for 
mega-projects such as urban transportation. Past research relied primarily on single 
case studies or broader surveys, and tended to focus exclusively on the contract 
design and planning process of infrastructure projects. This paper will compare the 
practices of the DBFO method with conventional public procurement models 
throughout the entire contractual time period. One suitable case study is the 
comparison of the Canada Line with the Expo	  and	  Millennium	  Lines in Vancouver. 
All of these three lines belong to the same metro network and were built in the same 
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jurisdiction area. However, while the Canada Line is a DBFO project, the Expo and 
Millennium Lines were constructed using the public sector delivery model.  
Based on the analysis of previous literature, this paper will use three variables to 
examine the benefits of the DBFO method: (1) the efficiency of the projects (on time 
and on budget); (2) fulfillment of original purposes; and (3) procedural transparency 
and effective public engagement. The next chapter will discuss these variables in both 
detail. More generally, by examining the factors that prevent DBFO projects from 
meeting their intended purposes, this paper will consider how the political context 
limits the potential advantages of P3s. 
 
Chapter Two: Methodology 
Research Design 
In this paper, I will use an in-depth case study based on the on-going public 
transportation investment in Greater Vancouver. I will build on the lessons learned 
from earlier studies on P3s, particularly with respect to the advantages of this public 
infrastructure method. My intent is to evaluate the effectiveness of using P3s rather 
than traditional procurement methods for developing urban rail transit. By comparing 
three rail transit lines in Vancouver—the Canada, Expo and Millennium Line—, I 
hope to connect theories with practical examples. As this paper will demonstrate, 
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despite state-of-the-art delivery mechanisms, Vancouver’s specific political context 
has significantly shaped the efficacy of PPPs.  
Choosing the Vancouver Context  
There are several reasons to choose the Vancouver context for my research. First, 
Vancouver has an important global position and a long history of urban transportation 
development. Although there is no “one-size-fits-all” in PPP projects, the research in 
Vancouver could provide useful information for other municipal Canadian 
governments, or even other countries, seeking to structure P3s in public transit 
agreements. Second, past research on the effectiveness of P3s was often a single case 
study or broader survey. However, in the Vancouver context, there are three different 
transit lines—or cases—to aid in the comparison of potential benefits of the PPP 
model. While the first two lines were constructed and operated using the public 
procurement process, TransLink used the DBFO model to build the Canada Line. All 
three lines belong to TransLink’s SkyTrain rapid transit system and use fully 
automated trains on grade-separated guideways. Furthermore, since they serve 
passengers in the same urban area, they have similar targeted users and the same 
revenue source. All three lines were developed under the same political system; thus, 
all three lines have similar political stakeholders and were developed under the same 
institutional framework. Since the same external factors influenced the planning 
process of these three mega-transit projects, this comparison strongly illustrates the 
effectiveness of the DBFO model. 
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Measurements 
To measure the potential benefits of the DBFO style of the PPP model, it is necessary 
to use reasonable variables to compare the three transit lines. According to the 
literature review chapter, there are three main benefits of P3s: (1) it transfers risks to 
the partner that can best manage it; (2) it improves the rationality of projects because 
the design and construction process respects technical specifications; and (3) it 
promotes the projects’ procedural accountability and financial responsibility. 
However, my project does not simply use these three benefits as variables, but instead 
combines theory with practice to compare one DBFO project and two non-DBFO 
projects. 
Considering the real condition of three cases, my research considers the following 
three variables to examine the effectiveness of the DBFO type of PPP model:  
(1) Efficiency (time and budget). Although the key point of “transferring risk” is to 
promote cost-savings and time saving, this is not reliable to measure the three Metro 
Vancouver transit lines since they were built according to different methods and in 
different time periods. To prove that the PPP model could improve the efficiency of 
public transit delivery, I will measure whether the three lines were delivered on 
budget and on time. Since these two indicators are not sufficient to prove the 
efficiency of P3s, I will also calculate the cost of construction per kilometers for each 
of the three lines. Finally, since some project teams changed the scope of 
infrastructure to meet the schedule and budget, I will match the final product of each 
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line with the original plan.  
(2) Fulfillment of original purposes. Each project was designed to fulfill its unique 
and specific purposes, such as a public request to improve services or to facilitate the 
hosting of world event. Thus, it is important for the project to realize its original 
purposes and desired outcomes—the basic condition of a successful public service 
delivery. In other words, the responsible public agencies or private concessionaires 
should be able to deliver public infrastructure according to the original plan.  
(3) Procedural transparency and effective public engagement. All public projects, 
whether DBFO project or not, should effectively engage the public and ensure 
procedural transparency. Residents’ concerns and opinions are essential parts of 
public service delivery. Thus, decision makers should respect public interests and try 
to implement public input in promoting sufficient governance. For example, local 
governments can hold public meetings and consultations to give residents the 
opportunity to participate in the decision-making process, potentially using these 
public opinions to modify construction and delivery plans. 
I will compare and discuss these three lines according to these measurements in 
Chapter 3. 
Data Sources 
In general, this report used secondary data from public documents to analyze the 
effectiveness of P3s for public transportation delivery. Public books, online news, and 
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journal articles were the main sources of my literature review. As one example, 
Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius, and Rothengatter’s Megaprojects and Risk: An Anatomy of 
Ambition (2003) provided useful information about the benefits of P3s and public 
mega-projects.  
I gathered all of my statistical data from official documents gathered from TransLink 
and British Columbia’s Ministry of Transportation. These two institutions are public 
agencies responsible for regional and provincial transportation networks. Government 
documents, such as official reports made available on the official website of the City 
of Vancouver, were also important statistical data sources. This data provides reliable 
information about the budget, overall cost, and construction time of these three lines. 
Since the Canada Line was constructed and operated by SNC-Lavalin, a private 
company, I collected data about this DBFO project from official documents and news 
releases available on the SNC-Lavalin website. Finally, Siemiatycki has written 
several important reports on the effectiveness of P3s and transportation development 
in Vancouver, respectively, which provide two valuable insights: first, whether PPPs 
deliver valuable transportation infrastructure; and, second, how specific political 
contexts shape governments’ decisions on transportation investment. 
History and Governance of Transportation Development in Vancouver  
This section will provide a discussion of the history and governance of transportation 
development in Vancouver. For over one hundred years, urban transportation has 
been a heated issue in Vancouver and a top public priority. In particular, urban 
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transportation has gathered such considerable political attention and public investment 
because of its importance to the city’s local economy and social inclusion. In response 
to a mega-congestion problem in Metro Vancouver, local governments continually 
need to develop action plans and approaches to improve urban transportation and ease 
traffic congestion.  
Urban transportation in Vancouver first began with the streetcar	  system, which 
commenced on 28 June 1890 and ran from the Granville Street Bridge to Westminster 
Avenue. The early set up of streetcars and transit stops shaped the city’s land use 
development, which some scholars consider a significant determinant in the 
subsequent division of land between commercial and residential districts (Davis, 
2006). No more than one year later, Canada's first inter-urban line began operation. 
From 1897 forward, the	  British Columbia Electric Railway (BCER) operated the 
urban and	  inter-urban rail system. In 1958, BCER developed "trackless"	  trolley and 
gasoline/diesel	  buses. Vancouver currently has the second largest	  trolley and bus fleet 
in North America (Snider, 2007).  
Vancouver’s transportation system was originally owned and operated by the private 
sector, but the public sector took over its ownership role when the private sector was 
no longer making enough profits to support further transportation development. 
Notably, Vancouver is the only Canadian city with falling rates of car ownership 
despite increased population growth—a statistic that has continued since the 1990s 
(City of Vancouver, 2007). Research suggests that Vancouver has the worst traffic 
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congestion in Canada; consequently, many people refuse to drive into the downtown 
core (Ferreras, 2013). Given public concern and interest in solving this congestion, 
local governments have sought to provide some useful solutions through 
transportation mega-projects. 
In Metro Vancouver, TransLink (also called the Greater Vancouver Transportation 
Authority, or GVTA) is the statutory authority responsible for the regional 
transportation network, major roads, bridges, and public transport (Skelhorne, 2007). 
The SkyTrain automated rail transit system is owned by TransLink and has three 
different urban rapid transit lines: the Expo Line, Millennium Line, and Canada Line. 
Figure 3 is the whole map of SkyTrain system. 
Figure 3: The Map of SkyTrain System 
Source from: TransLink 
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TransLink was created as a public agency in 1998 and fully implemented in 1999 by 
the Government of British Columbia to replace BC Transit in the Greater Vancouver 
Regional Transit. Since Vancouver has two tiers of local government, the regional 
government and the lower tier municipality, Translink is a separate body that is 
responsible for transportation in Metro Vancouver, not just an agency of a single local 
government. TransLink provides a bus service, an automated rapid transit service 
called SkyTrain, and the West Coast Express commuter rail. Vancouver's SkyTrain 
system began in 1986 and is currently running on three lines: the Expo Line, the 
Millennium Line, and the Canada Line. Only the Canada Line was constructed and 
operated using a DBFO type of PPP model. 
Importantly, there are new plans in development for the SkyTrain System. 
The planned Evergreen Line is expected to link the cities of Coquitlam and Port 
Moody with the SkyTrain system by summer 2016  (British Columbia Ministry of 
Transportation, 2011). TransLink has also decided to extend the SkyTrain Millennium 
Line and the Expo Line to serve the increasing public need for public transportation.  
The next section will provide a detailed comparison of the current three lines in the 
SkyTrain System to examine the effectiveness of using P3s for urban transit. 
Specifically, I will introduce the three cases in the specific context of Vancouver to 
determine whether or not these lines meet public interests.  
 
	   29	  
Overview of Three Cases  
Figure 4: Basic Information of Three Rail Transit Lines 
    Information 
Lines 
Overall 
Shape 
Scale  
 
Overall 
Costs 
Construction 
Time 
Daily 
Ridership 
The Expo Line 
 
Termini:  
Waterfront 
King George 
 
Stations: 20. 
Line 
length: 
28.9 km; 
21.4 km 
(initial 
length) 
 
Number 
of tracks: 
2 
 
Operating 
speed: 
80 km/h 
Budget of 
the original 
one*: 
$854 
million 
(1986 
dollars); on 
budget 
 
1981 – early 
1985 
(The original 
one/phase 1); 
on time 
289,460 
(June 
2011)* 
 
The Millennium 
Line 
Termini: 
Waterfront  
via Columbia 
VCC–Clark 
 
Stations:  
28 - stops at 
Commercial-
Broadway 
twice (16 
shared with 
Expo Line) 
Line 
length: 
20.3 km 
  
Number 
of tracks: 
2 
 
Operating 
speed: 
80 km/h. 
$1.2 billion; 
on budget 
October 1999 
- August 2002; 
on time 
289,460 
(June 
2011)* 
 
The Canada 
Line (a DBFO 
project) 
Termini: 
Waterfront 
YVR–
Airport &  
Richmond–
Brighouse 
 
Stations: 16 
Line 
length: 
19.2km 
 
Number 
of tracks: 
2 
 
Operating 
speed: 
80 km/h. 
$1.9 billion; 
on budget 
October 2005 
– August 2009; 
On time 
 
136,259 
(June 
2011) 
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Note: 1. Since the Expo Line has had several extension and reconstruction after its 
original construction, I am only considering the construction cost and construction 
time for Expo 86.  
2. The daily ridership total of 289,460 is for both the Expo and Millennium 
Lines. 
Source: Wikipedia; Translink, 2011 
Figure 4 summarizes the basic information of three lines.   
Expo Line 
The Expo Line is the oldest line of the SkyTrain rapid transit system in Metro 
Vancouver. Originally, the line was simply known as “SkyTrain” as it was the only 
line on the system. It was given its present name following the development of the 
“Millennium Line”, which launched in 2002 (Wikipedia, n.d.). The Expo Line was 
initially a demonstration project of the 1986 Vancouver World’s Fair (“Expo 86”). 
The Expo Line’s main original purpose was to demonstrate the newly 
developed linear induction propulsion technology to people across the globe who 
attended the World’s Fair. As the main attraction of the event, the project was 
successfully designed and became the central line of rapid rail transit in Vancouver 
(Taggart, 2001). 
Following the demonstration project in 1981, construction of the first phase of the 
Expo Line between Vancouver and	  New Westminster was completed in early 1985. It 
opened on schedule in January 1986 and was built on a budget of $854 million (1986 
dollars) with an initial 21.4 km of guideway, 15 stations, and 114 SkyTrain cars. The 
final overall cost of the Expo Line was right under the budget (TransLink, 2011). The 
Expo Line is now 28.9 kms and has 20 stations from Waterfront to King George 
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Stations, travelling mainly through the Dunsmuir Tunnel. In 2001, the daily ridership 
of the Expo Line was 289,460 (TransLink, 2011); however,  this number is shared 
with the Millennium Line because these two lines have the same the same track 
alignment from	  Waterfront Station in	  Downtown Vancouver to	  Columbia Station 
in	  New Westminster.  
Despite these recent extensions (phase II and phase III), this papers focuses only on 
the original development of the Expo Line in order to more clearly discuss the 
project’s overall costs and construction timeline. 
Millennium Line 
Following the increasing need of the urban rapid transit to solve the congestion 
problem in Metro Vancouver and improve air quality, provincial and local 
governments in the Greater Vancouver Area decided to extend the route of the Expo 
Line, which became a new rail line called “Millennium Line”. The total length of the 
Millennium Line is 20.3 km and it has 28 stations, 16 of which are shared with the 
Expo Line from Waterfront to Columbia Stations. The Millennium Line then loops 
back into Vancouver via a new route and terminates at VCC–Clark Station 
(Wikipedia, n.d.). 
The construction of the Millennium Line, including phase I and II, began in October 
1999 and finished on time in August 2002 (TransLink, 2001). The Millennium Line 
was completed at a cost of $1.2 billion, approximately $40 million under budget 
(Wales, 2008). 
	   32	  
As previously discussed, the Millennium Line shares daily ridership figures with the 
Expo Line. Therefore, in June 2001, the Millennium and Expo Lines served 289,460 
passengers per day. According to 2007 statistics, the non-interlined portion of the 
Millennium Line served an average of 70,000 passengers per day (TransLink, 2007).  
Canada Line 
As the third line in SkyTrain metro network, Canada Line	  comprises 19.2 kilometers 
of track and has 16 stations (Wikipedia, n.d.). It begins at	  Waterfront Station and 
splits: the Richmond branch terminates at	  Richmond–Brighouse Station and the 
airport branch terminates at	  YVR–Airport Station (InTransitBC, 2006). 
Unlike the other two lines, the Canada Line was constructed with a DBFO style of 
PPP model. The Canada Line project appealed to both local government and private 
investors because of the desire for improved collaboration between public and private 
sectors to plan and finance public delivery, as well as the new infrastructure needed to 
serve the influx of visitors who would attend the 2010 Vancouver Winter Olympic 
Games. 
The four public funding shareholders for the funding for Canada Line— Translink (as 
the representative of the regional government), the provincial government, the federal 
government, and the Vancouver International Airport Authority—authorized Canada 
Line Rapid Transit Inc. (CLCO) to consult the public and develop different ideas for 
the project. The Canada Line was ultimately built by SNC-Lavalin and InTransitBC 
will manage the line for 35 years under a contract with TransLink. Although 
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SNC-Lavalin contributed to the financing process of the project, the Canada Line was 
mainly financed by the public sector. This feature makes the Canada Line initiative 
different from a typical DBFO project (Figure 5).   
 
      Variable 
Type 
Design Constructi
on 
Financi
ng 
Ownersh
ip 
Operati
on 
Design-Build-Finance
-Operate 
PR PR PR PU PR 
The Canada Line 
Project 
PR PR PU PU PR 
Figure 5: The Difference between the typical DBFO model and the Canada Line 
project 
The construction of the Canada Line began in October 2005 and finished in August 
2009. Although it was originally scheduled to open on November 30, 2009, the Line 
was ready fifteen weeks ahead of schedule, well in advance of the Olympics (Sinoski, 
2009). Moreover, the overall cost of the project was $2.1 billion, $92 million under 
budget. The projected ridership for the Canada Line is 100,000 boardings per day in 
2013, rising to 142,000 boardings per day by 2021. So far, the Canada Line has 
successfully exceeded its targets. Specifically, during the 17 days of the 2010 Winter 
Olympics, the line carried an average of 228,190 passengers per day (Vancouver Sun, 
2010). 
Overview  
To conclude, the Greater Vancouver Region’s three rapid rail transit lines—the Expo, 
Millennium, and Canada Lines—were each built according to different funding and 
procurement methods. The Expo Line and Millennium Line are operated by the 
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British Columbia Rapid Transit Company under a contract with	  TransLink, a public 
transportation agency. As a DBFO project, private	   concessionaire	   ProTrans	   BC	  operates	   the	   Canada	   Line	   under	   a	   contract	   with	   TransLink. Notably, the 
construction and operation of the Expo Line (phase I) occurred before the 
establishment of TransLink.  
 
Chapter Three: Analysis of the Vancouver Case 
The fundamental purpose of this paper is to assess the potential gains of using a 
DBFO model for building urban rail transit infrastructure as opposed to a "traditional" 
public sector procurement model. In this chapter, I will use a DBFO case and two 
non-DBFO cases to compare and also analyze the impact of the political context on 
the effectiveness of P3s.  
Comparison of the Three Lines 
Using basic information about the three rapid transit lines in the Region of Vancouver, 
this section measures the effectiveness of the DBFO model according to the following 
three variables: efficiency, fulfillment of original purpose, and procedural 
transparency and public engagement. 
Efficiency  
Efficiency is the most important merit of the DBFO model. Normally, academics use 
cost saving as the chief indicator of the efficiency. A DBFO model to deliver urban 
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transportation infrastructure is generally less costly than if a public agency delivered 
the same project. However, each PPP project is different and the Canada Line is no 
exception. 
In building the Canada Line, SNC-Lavalin contributed only a small percentage of 
construction funding. The total cost to build the Canada Line was $2.1 billion; the 
federal government, the provincial government, the Vancouver airport, and Translink 
contributed $400 million, $400 million, $300 million, and $375 million, respectively 
(Bula, 2010). Since the cost savings in this case were small, I will investigate other 
efficiencies such scheduled completion time and budget.  
According to the public information I discussed in the previous chapter, all three lines 
were delivered on budget and on time; the Millennium Line and the Canada Line 
were even delivered under budget. For this analysis, “on budget” represents the 
overall cost of construction that is under the final budget and does not include any 
cost overruns that occurred during the planning process.  
At this point, it is important to examine the efficiency of P3s by comparing the 
construction cost of the three transit lines per kilometer and matching the final 
product with the original plan.  
(a) Construction Cost Per Kilometer (results retain one digit after the decimal point) 
         
Information 
Lines     
Length (km) Overall Cost 
(million/billion) 
Construction cost 
per kilometer 
(million /km) 
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The Expo Line 21.4 $854 million (1986 
dollars) = $1.684 
billion ≈ $1.7 
billion* 
$79.4 million/km 
The Millennium 
Line 
20.3 $1.2 billion $59.1 million/km 
The Canada Line 19.2 $1.9 billion $98.9 million/km 
Figure 6: Construction cost per kilometer 
Note: 1. To calculate the present value of 1986 dollars, I used the Inflation Calculator 
on the Back of Canada website. The Inflation Calculator uses monthly consumer price 
index	  (CPI) data from 1914 to the present to show changes in the cost of a fixed 
"basket" of consumer purchases1.  
The initial Expo Line was 21.4 km and its construction cost was $854 million in 1986 
dollars, which is equal to a present-day value of $1.7 billion. Therefore, the 
construction cost of the Expo Line is $79.4 million/km. Using the same calculation 
method, the construction cost of the Canada Line is $109.3 million/km. 
Although the total length of the Millennium Line is 42.1 km, it shares 16 stations with 
the Expo Line. Independent of the Expo Line, its length is 20.3 km and includes 13 
stations that are not shared with the Expo Line. Notably, these stations were designed 
dramatically different from those on the Expo Line (Skelhorne, 2007; Wales, 2008). 
Furthermore, since the $1.2 billion construction cost focused mainly on these 20.3 km, 
the construction cost of the Millennium Line is $59.1 million/km. A comparison of 
the three lines (Figure 6) demonstrates that the Canada Line project has the highest 
construction cost per kilometer. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Inflation Calculator: Retrieved from: http://www.bankofcanada.ca/rates/related/inflation-calculator/. 
Data Source: Statistics Canada, Consumer Price Indexes For Canada, Monthly (V41690973 series). 
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(b) Matching the Final Product with the Original Plan.  
Although all three lines were built on budget (final budget) and on time, it is 
important to match the final product with the original plan to see whether the project 
team made changes during the planning and construction process.  
First, we need to consider the reason why all three lines could be built on schedule. 
With completion of the rail line intended for the start of Expo 1986, the Expo Line 
project proceeded on an accelerated schedule. To maximize the efficiency of the 
project, BC Transit (the public agency in charge of the line) and Metro Canada 
Limited decided to integrate their staff in a Joint Project Office (Siemiatycki, 2006). 
Having learned from their experience developing the first Skytrain line, local 
planning establishments and project management teams were considerably more 
proficient in meeting their schedule to deliver the Millennium Line on time. For the 
Canada Line, the situation was similar to the circumstances surrounding the Expo 
Line’s construction: the 2010 Vancouver Winter Olympics created an imperative to 
construct and open the new line on time. 
Second, by matching the finished product with the original plan, we can determine 
whether the project team changed the scope of the project or if there were cost 
overruns during the planning and construction process. The construction cost of the 
first phase of the Expo Line cost $1.16 billion, including $854.4 million in capital 
costs and another $161 million in interest payments (all in 1986 dollars) (BC Transit 
1989). This number was much higher than the $718.4 million (in 1986 dollars) 
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predicted by the UTA in their final 1983 cost estimates. In 1999, the cost for the first 
phase of the Millennium Lines was expected to well-exceed the capped $600 million 
budget. As a result, Translink requested an additional $25 million in provincial 
funding to achieve the necessary infrastructure to integrate the Millennium Line with 
the Expo Line. The provincial government’s response was to ask the municipalities to 
reduce their list of infrastructure integration features. To build within budget, the 
construction of the Millennium Line cut five kilometers from the original proposed 
Phase II terminus at Granville Street and 10th Avenue (Wales, 2008). In December 
2004, with considerable scope changes to remove stations and public amenity features 
and with additional funding provided by both public and private sectors, the Canada 
Line project proposed by SNC-Lavalin was given final approval for development at a 
total cost of $1.72 billion. However, the final construction cost of the project came in 
at $1.9 billion, a 22 percent increase over early cost estimates (Boei 2005). Thus, 
although three lines were built on budget (final budget), all three lines had cost 
overruns during the planning and construction phase.. 
Fulfillment of Original Objectives 
To compare initial projections of the project's impact with the project’s actual impacts, 
we need to determine the main purpose of each case. Vancouver has had a consistent 
congestion problem and long history of urban transportation development. In the early 
1980s, the elected Social Credit Government won a narrow victory due to the 
economic recession. Then-Premier Bennett announced his “British Columbia Place” 
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stadium project. The construction of British Columbia Place stadium would be 
complemented by the hosting of Expo 86, a world fair for the latest in transportation 
innovations. Furthermore, British Columbia’s provincial government could get extra 
funding from the federal government and urban development agency for using an 
innovative technology provided by the Ontario Urban Transit Development 
Corporation (UTA, 1983). Then the construction of the Expo Line was politically 
driven in the sense that the provincial government used the development of this 
mega-project to earn political support. Consequently, Expo 86 made Vancouver an 
international transportation showcase and the Social Credit government won nearly 
half the popular vote and a far larger proportion of the seats in the legislature in the 
subsequent election (Elections BC, 2005). Similarly, in 1995, the provincial NDP 
government’s decision to build the Millennium Line was also motivated by the 
potential political benefits of undertaking a transit mega-project. Both the Expo and 
the Millennium Line successfully achieved their respective political purposes even 
though they each failed to relieve congestion completely or improve air quality 
(Poudenx, 2004). Despite the many thousands of people that use these lines every day, 
increasing population has not eased the traffic congestion problems in Metro 
Vancouver. 
Unlike other two lines, the local government used the DBFO type of PPP as a 
mechanism to alleviate problems that had existed in earlier transit mega-project 
planning in Vancouver, including political interference, a lack of procedural 
transparency, and escalating costs. Unfortunately, these expected results have not met 
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expectations. Although this transportation delivery method has increased the overall 
accountability of the project, the involvement of the private sector neither minimized 
the cost escalation nor promoted technology innovation (Siemiatycki, 2006). 
Furthermore, while each public shareholder of the Canada Line had their own unique 
interest for investing in this mega project, the 2010 Winter Olympics was the true 
motivation for the Canada Line.. As previously discussed, the Canada Line opened 15 
weeks ahead of schedule, well in advance of the Olympics. Moreover, the daily 
ridership totals have consistently exceeded its early targets (Wales, 2008). Therefore, 
the construction of the Canada Line has successfully achieved part of its original goal. 
Public Involvement and Procedural Transparency 
The power of “public control” is most evident during public consultations and 
meetings held during the decision-making process. During the planning process of the 
Expo and Millennium lines, local governments did not hold public consultations to 
gather public concerns. Public meetings during this phase of the planning process 
were held only to receive citizen support of the project and consequently failed to 
provide enough information for the public. For example, the public was generally 
unaware of how much higher the construction costs were for advanced rail transit 
such as the Expo Line and the Millennium Line compared to conventional rail transit 
or the extension of basic surface-level traffic services (Siemiatycki, 2006). 
For the Canada Line, the DBFO model has increased some degree of public 
accountability for the project. Agencies made a consistent effort to undertake public 
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consultation for the Canada line during its planning and development phase, 
especially for the competition and selection of the private sector project partner. 
However, the urgency of the Olympics and the need to maintain the integrity of the 
competition nevertheless resulted in a partial lack of transparency in this case. The 
responsible public agency did not properly inform citizens of alternative construction 
methods during the consultation process; when the public heard from news reports 
that the line was going to be built using the cut-and-cover method, they were 
surprised because they believed that the line would be constructed using the 
deep-bore tunneling method. In fact, cut-and-cover methods have several advantages 
over deep-bore tunneling methods, including reduced cost, less risk of delay, and 
closer proximity to the surface-level, improving user access. However, the lack of 
transparency about these methods resulted in reduced transparency (Greenwood, 
2005). 
Conclusion  
Variable 
Line 
 
Efficiency Fulfillment of  
Main Purpose 
Transparency/ 
Public involvement 
The Expo Line On Budget  
On Time 
Cost overrun during 
the planning process 
Yes/No Less Transparency 
The Millennium 
Line 
On Budget 
On Time 
Cost overrun during 
the planning process; 
Changed of scope 
Yes/No Less Transparency 
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The Canada Line On Budget 
On Time 
Highest construction 
cost per kilometer; 
Changed of scope 
Cost overrun during 
the planning process 
Yes/No Some degree of 
public involvement 
but transparency still 
reduced 
Figure 7: Comparison of the Three Lines 
Figure 7 summarizes the comparison of the Expo, Millennium, and the Canada Lines. 
Although all three lines were successfully achieved their political purpose, they failed 
to meet other important goals. Consequently, this analysis demonstrates that the use 
of a DBFO approach to the development of the Canada Line did not improve cost 
efficiency, failed to achieve its original purpose, and had less procedural transparency 
than expected. As a result of this comparison, I would conclude that P3s do not seem 
to be effective for urban rail transit. However, there is a crucial aspect not yet 
discussed: the impact of political interests on each case. Political interference existed 
in the planning and construction process of three lines, which I will analyze in the 
next section.  
The Political Context in Vancouver 
Unlike any other municipality in North America, Vancouver has a unique political 
context for urban transportation development., From the streetcar system in the late 
nineteenth-century to the contemporary SkyTrain System, the city has not stopped 
constructing various transportation services since the city was established in 1886. 
Persistent congestion problems in Metro Vancouver and the political advantages 
associated with solving this problem have spurred local governments to continually 
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develop urban transit solutions. Urban transit proposals are popular with the general 
public because of the potential to relieve traffic congestion and create new business 
opportunities and investments. As one example, the NDP earned support from 
right-of-center Social Credit voters in the 1975 provincial election precisely because 
they were concerned about transportation investment. From this period forward, no 
governing provincial government in British Columbia would underestimate the 
importance of public perception in transportation planning (Siemiatycki, 2006). 
The Expo Line 
As previously discussed, the broader political context for transportation planning in 
Greater Vancouver was transformed during the 1979 election. The Social Credit 
government won a narrow election victory and lost political support because of the 
growing economic recession. To gain political capital, then-Premier Bennett 
announced the British Columbia Place stadium project at the Transpo 86 (Expo 86), a 
world fair showcasing the latest transportation innovations in celebration of 
Vancouver's centenary. Bennett’s government was explicitly motivated to build the 
Canada transit line to stimulate economic development and retrench political support 
for the Social Credit party (Olds, 2001). 
As a politically driven project, the Social Credit provincial government believed that 
the development of the Canada Line would create new business opportunities and 
stimulate the economy. This is generally why the government did not care about the 
dramatic capital cot escalation during the planning process (Hilferink, 2004). As 
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previously discussed, although the project eventually met its final budget, costs had 
already escalated during the planning process. Furthermore, although the Expo Line is 
a regional project, the provincial government lead the delivery of this public 
infrastructure and acted in the role of local officials. In order to make Vancouver a 
world-class city like Toronto and Montreal, Expo 86 and the World’s Fair became a 
symbol of the Social Credit provincial government’s leadership. Although the Line 
was eventually delivered on time and on budget, political motivation spurred the 
project management team to change its original scope to meet the purpose of the 
World’s Fair. Since the congestion problem was not the main motivation for the 
government’s investment in this transit mega-project, the design and operation of the 
Expo line failed to meet public concerns about traffic jams (Siemiatycki, 2006). 
Project managers also failed to effectively engage the public because decision makers 
wanted to ensure the project would be conducted as they originally planned with 
minimal public interference. 
The Millennium Line 
The Expo Line proved that the mega-transportation projects could help the sitting 
government gain political support, leading to the repeated selection of mega-project 
initiatives to help solve the growing congestion problem in Metro Vancouver. 
Although the provincial NDP (1996-1999) and their leader, Glen Clark, were against 
the Expo Line project that had been delivered by the previous Social Credit 
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Government, they nevertheless still wanted the potential benefits of undertaking a 
transit mega-project once they came to power.  
For the NDP provincial government, the decision to invest in the Millennium Line 
was less about moving people, and was instead presented as an important milestone to 
gain political capital. Although other alternatives such as increasing the size of the 
bus fleet and implementing bus-only lanes are less expensive solutions than advanced 
rail transit, the provincial governments nevertheless have political incentives to 
continue to investing in transportation mega-projects (Siemiatycki, 2006).  
In this political context, governments failed to deliver the transit line efficiently. 
Although they gained experience from the delivery of the Expo Line and despite the 
fact that the Millennium line had the fewest construction cost per kilometer, project 
managers still changed the scope during the construction period to meet budgetary 
constraints (Wales, 2008). This resulted in less effective public engagement and less 
procedural transparency. Similar to the planning process of the Expo Line, 
governments provided minimal opportunities for residents to learn details about the 
project and express their concerns in order to make sure the transit line was delivered 
as planned. Nevertheless, transportation mega-projects are so popular that the 
provincial government gained political capital despite again failing to address 
congestion problems in Metro Vancouver.  
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The Canada Line 
Although previous mega-projects faced criticism, a neo-liberal approach to 
transportation planning made it politically tenable for Gordon Campbell and his 
right-of-centre Liberal Party to promote another mega-project in the Greater 
Vancouver area (Siemiatycki, 2006). The application of DBFO model was the central 
reason for the rise of the Canada Line project. 
Although the most urgent reason to build the line was the need to meet the 2010 
Winter Olympics deadline, all the public shareholders of the Canada Line had unique 
political interests spurring their investment in the mega-project. The governing 
Liberal federal government thought investing in the Canada Line could increase 
electoral support for the provincial Liberal government in British Columbia. The 
provincial government believed that the Canada Line was a chance for the newly 
elected Liberal Party to align urban development with party interests. Developing the 
Canada Line as the cornerstone of regional transportation plans could also create 
benefits for the entire region (Fry, 2005). These political interests explain why the 
Canada Line was mainly financed by the public sector, a significant difference from 
the typical DBFO project.  
Furthermore, the project proceeded on an accelerated schedule:  “There was 
immense pressure from the national and provincial government on each level of local 
government to provide approvals that furthered the RAV development plan, since any 
level of government that refused funding would be seen as the one that scuttled a 
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popular and necessary infrastructure project” (Siemiatycki, 2006). Although all 
government stakeholders agreed that private-sector financing would be critical to the 
realization of the project, the provincial government went as far as to make its 
financial contribution contingent on the project’s delivery (Doyle, 2002). 
Nevertheless, the planning process of the Canada Line did not effectively involve the 
public. Moreover, public stakeholders could not transfer risks to SNC-Lavalin which 
would have better prevented cost escalations and time delays. As the result, the 
construction of the Canada line had a 22 percent cost overrun above early cost 
estimates during the planning process (Boei 2005).  
According to this comparative analysis of the Expo, Millennium, and Canada Line 
and their respective political context, there was little apparent advantage overall to the 
DFBO model in the Vancouver setting based on efficiency, fulfillment of original 
purpose, and procedural transparency. 
Conclusion: The Impacts of the Political Context  
In this chapter, I introduced and discussed three rail transit lines in Metro Vancouver: 
the Expo Line, the Millennium Line and the Canada Line (a DBFO project). However, 
I cannot prove the effectiveness of using P3s for urban rail transit based on the 
comparison of three variables: efficiency, fulfillment of original purpose, and 
procedural transparency.  
The broader political environment significantly influenced these three measurements. 
First, governments will change the scope of projects to deliver transit lines on budget 
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and on time. When a world event occurs, such as the World’s Fair or the Olympics, 
this event becomes the main motivation for government investment in public 
transportation and projects will proceed according to a rushed schedule. Second, these 
projects are all politically driven, aimed at improving political capital and garnering 
votes rather than meeting public concerns. In general, governments were unconcerned 
about cost escalations during the planning process because this did not impact the 
political motivation for their initial investment in the mega-project. This is the chief 
reason why these transportation mega-projects have failed to solve congestion 
problems. Specifically, the Canada Line project did not demonstrate the benefits of 
P3s as expected. Third, to make sure that the project is delivered as planned, the 
provincial government tended to interfere the planning process of all three transit 
lines. Even in the DBFO project, the project team did not engage the public 
effectively and also failed to provide enough opportunities for residents to express 
their concerns. 
Since transportation planning in Vancouver shares much in common with a top-down 
system, the political context has a huge impact on public infrastructure delivery. The 
promotion of mega-projects in Metro Vancouver highlights how closely connected 
transit planning and infrastructure investment decisions are with local and national 
development policies and political election strategies. In the Vancouver context, the 
provincial government’s political incentives ultimately decided the final outcomes of 
these mega-transportation projects. If investment in urban transit is simply a tool for 
governments to gain a political advantage, it ultimately does not matter whether 
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responsible agencies use the conventional public procurement method or a PPP 
model. 
 
Chapter Four: The Chinese Context 
In this chapter, I will connect the Vancouver case to the Chinese context. P3s have 
been implemented in China for more than two decades. They have become the 
primary method for local governments to deliver public services and infrastructure. 
Although the political system in China differs significantly from the Canadian system, 
the following chapter will overview the impact of the political context on the 
effectiveness of using P3s for public transportation delivery in the Chinese context. 
PPP Practices in China 
The development of P3s in China has experienced three periods. First is the period of 
exploration (1850-1930). The market liberalization reforms of public services 
stimulated the rise of PPPs in China, giving private investors increased access to 
market space originally controlled by the government (Wang, 2013). During this 
period, there were minimal bidding processes and governments did not promulgate 
related regulations and legislations for P3s. The second period occurred between 
1994-2002, often called the “pilot time”. National and local governments 
implemented many pilot projects to test the feasibility of the PPP model, including 
transportation, wastewater treatment, and so forth. Chinese academics also started 
their research on P3s during this time period. From 2002 to 2008, the development of 
	   50	  
P3s in China entered into the third phase: the promotion stage. The National Ministry 
of Construction has successfully implemented a number of documents to regulate the 
structure of PPP projects (n.d., 2014). Overall, P3s have been increasingly applied as 
the primary mechanism of public service delivery. At the same time, governments 
tended to improve the design of P3s through learning experiences gained from failed 
projects.  
According to official data from PPP Center of National Ministry of Finance, P3s have 
been vigorously implemented. As of Feb 29, 2016, there are a total of 7710 PPP 
projects across the country with over ￥8.3 trillion investments covering energy, 
transportation, water conservancy construction, ecological construction and 
environmental protection, municipal engineering, and 19 other industries (China 
Economic Weekly, 2016). Specifically, due to growing traffic demands, enormous 
investment requirements, and high fiscal pressures, PPPs have been increasingly 
recognized as the most effective method for governments to deliver large-scale 
transport infrastructure projects (Mu, Jong, Koppenjan, 2011). Consequently, the 
construction and financing of public transpiration has been steadily moving from 
public sector government to private sector firms.  
Rapid transit has become the preferred transportation technology for Chinese 
governments in attempting to solve the problem of population density and inadequate 
space. According to the 2010 China Metro Annual Report, the operational length of 
metro systems increased from 143 to 960 km during a ten-year time period (China 
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Metro Annual Report Team, 2010). Facing the increasing need to improve metro 
transit amidst fiscal management challenges, local governments noticed that the PPP 
model could be a good mechanism for transportation infrastructure delivery. Cities 
such as Shenzhen and Beijing applied a PPP model in their metro development in 
2004 and 2006, respectively (Chang, 2013). Chongqing, the most populous city in 
China, has recently signed over ￥130 billion worth of PPP projects, including eight 
highway projects and several rapid transit projects (Chinanews, 2016).   	  
Political Constraints  
In theory, there are several benefits for governments to apply a PPP arrangement, as 
discussed in the literature review chapter. Private entities have incentives to reduce 
cost, engage the public, and improve management and operational efficiency of public 
projects. Some literature suggests that some governments experiencing severe 
financial constraints, such as Chinese local governments, tend to use the PPP model 
more commonly than others (Hammami, Ruhashyankiko, and Yehoue, 2006). 
These benefits are not always consistent. Since late 2009, there has been a tendency to 
decrease private participation in public infrastructure and services in China. Some 
public agencies in China experienced various forms of opportunistic behavior when 
they interacted with private entities (Chang, 2013). For example, a local government 
in Tianjin broke their contract with a private company during the operation phase of a 
PPP power plant project (n.d., 2016). According to the provisions of the contract, the 
municipality was supposed to provide financial subsidies to the private sector if the 
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project failed to collect sufficient profits. In 2002, government subsidies accounted 
for less than ￥58 million, only 1.25 percent of the company’s main business income, 
resulting in the project’s failure.  
The political context is ultimately an important factor affecting the effectiveness of 
P3s in China. Notably, the political environment in China differs considerably from 
Canada. China is a top-down system and the national government tends to frequently 
interfere in local affairs. As the result, private entities often have little space to 
demonstrate their advantages, such as reduced cost or improved efficiencies, when 
municipalities try to structure a PPP project. A classic example of this is the National 
Stadium (nicknamed the “Bird’s Nest”), which began as a PPP project before it 
became a typical governmental infrastructure (Tian, 2015). The cooperation between 
the Beijing municipal government and Zhongxin Group Consortium (which consists 
of four private companies) ended just one year after the operation of the “Bird’s Nest”. 
The political context was the chief reason for the failure of the National Stadium PPP 
project.  
Following China’s successful bid for the 2008 Beijing Olympic games, national and 
municipal governments sought to make Beijing a global city and improve China’s 
international reputation. As the epicenter of the Olympics, the National Stadium 
attracted more political attention than other projects. Similar to the Canada Line 
project in Vancouver, the public sector was the main investor of the “Bird’s Nest” 
(Tian, 2015). However, because the Beijing government was overly involved in the 
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design process, the private sector has limited ability to structure the project more 
efficiently and scientifically (Tian, 2015).  
According to my study of the Canada Line project, the political context shapes the 
effectiveness of the PPP model. If a PPP project is politically driven, it may fail to 
deliver its desired outcomes, such as improved project efficiency, fulfillment to its 
original purpose, or effective engagement with the public. Since China is a top-down 
political system and local governments in China have recently promoted the 
development of P3s and signed up a number of rapid transit PPP projects, it is 
important for these governments to notice the potential loss of benefits of P3s because 
of this political element. When a public project is driven by popularity, re-election 
concerns, or elite interests rather than sound public policy judgments or public 
interests, governments are motivated to interfere with the planning process of PPP 
projects to ensure that the project proceeds as planned. Consequently, the construction 
of projects may exceed its original estimated cost and fail to meet public expectations. 
Conclusion  
In recent decades, PPPs have been recognized as an effective mechanism for public 
infrastructure delivery. The enormous investments that accompany mega-transit 
infrastructure projects have led to significant financing and operation policy changes 
in Canada. In theory, P3s could integrate the advantages of both public and private 
sector infrastructure delivery by transferring risk to the partner best able to manage it, 
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increasing the project’s rationality, and improve the project’s procedural transparency 
and financial responsibility. 
However, the political context will affect the potential benefits of P3s. In the case of 
Vancouver, although the Canada Line is a DBFO project—unlike the public 
procurement method used to design and finance the Expo Line and the Millennium 
Line—all of three lines failed to deliver their desired outcomes. In each case, there 
were different goals: those actually related to transportation, and those related to other 
aims. As previously discussed, while these three lines successfully achieved their 
political purposes, they all failed to meet public interests, such as relieving traffic 
congestion or improving air quality. 
Consequently, there is little apparent advantage of the DBFO model according to a 
comparison of these three projects in the Vancouver setting. The BC provincial 
government had a huge impact on the investment of large transportation projects in 
the Metro Vancouver area. As a politically driven project, the project management 
team of the Canada Line did not promote a competitive selection nor engage in a 
reasonable consultation process to effectively engage the private sector and the 
general public. Under this top-down system, local governments are driven by political 
interests and do not care about the feasibility of P3s. Despite the fact that Chinese 
local governments are very different from Canadian municipalities, PPP projects in 
China also face similar challenges because the political context similarly undermines 
the effectiveness and efficiency of the PPP model of infrastructure delivery. 
	   55	  
Contributions  
According to the case study, when government has a political motivation in financing 
a mega-project, it may fail to optimally structure a PPP; accordingly, P3s will lose 
some potential benefits of public infrastructure delivery. Although P3s have 
theoretical advantages in some circumstances, its overall effectiveness will be 
influenced by the political context. If a project is chiefly politically driven, then the 
method of financing and design is simply a tool for political purposes; in these 
circumstances, there is little advantage to the PPP model over a traditional procure 
method. 
Further Research 
The comparison of the three rapid rail transit lines in Vancouver was based on three 
variables—efficiency, fulfillment of original purposes and effective public 
engagement—each of which could be improved by considering transaction costs in 
the subsection of budget calculation. There has been increasing academic interest in 
Chinese PPP practices during the past decade. Current research on China's PPP 
agreements focuses mainly on risk allocation. Since there is no detailed analysis on 
the implications of the PPP model in China, deeper investigation on the influence of 
political context is required. To better understand the benefits, costs, and limits of the 
PPP model in China, detailed research on a Chinese rapid transit PPP case would be 
beneficial.  
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